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Abstract 
Palestinians widely believe that highly-skilled migration in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is 
increasing. However, this phenomenon and its consequences, have rarely, if ever, been examined. This 
paper attempts to address highly-skilled migration in the oPt and to assess its volume in light of 
available data and studies. It also reanalyses data provided by previous surveys. Most relevant studies 
have failed to accurately assess the volume of Palestinian migration to other countries. The Population 
Census though, published by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in 1997, provides an 
important source on the examination and general features of return migration.  
This paper demonstrates that the volume of Palestinian highly-skilled migration greatly outweighs 
return migration. Very difficult circumstances throughout the oPt have drained skills and competences. 
Certain circumstances are related to long-standing Israeli occupation, whilst others relate to socio-
economic factors.  
Official or non-official initiatives for identifying the scope of highly-skilled migration and for 
overcoming its negative effects are not in place. Clear policies have not yet been developed to control 
this phenomenon. Given the special status of the Palestinian territory, migration may also be positive. It 
may provide a temporary alternative for the recovery of the Palestinian economic situation. If regulated 
and guided on sound grounds, migration will also help create a strategy for future development. In this 
context, the establishment of both higher-education institutions and the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) have highlighted a significant return of skilled Palestinians from abroad. Therefore, working 
towards creating the proper environment that reduces the migration of the needed and attracting others 
from abroad should be a priority for official and non-official Palestinian institutions.  
Résumé 
Les palestiniens sont nombreux à penser que l’émigration des travailleurs qualifiés ne cesse 
d’augmenter. Cependant, ce phénomène comporte encore de nombreuses zones d’ombres et ses 
caractéristiques comme ses conséquences doivent être évaluées plus rigoureusement. Cette étude vise 
à combler cette lacune en évaluant l’ampleur de la migration hautement qualifiée depuis et vers les 
territoires palestiniens occupés à la lumière des données et études disponibles. Elle analyse également 
les données provenant d’enquêtes précédentes.  
Les études existantes ne sont pas parvenues à évaluer de façon satisfaisante le nombre d’émigrés 
palestiniens. Néanmoins, le recensement de la population, publié en 1997 par le Bureau Central des 
Statistiques en Palestine, permet de cerner les caractéristiques générales de la migration de retour. Or 
la présente étude démontre que l’émigration qualifiée depuis la Palestine est un phénomène qui, de par 
son ampleur, dépasse largement la migration de retour. Il est alimenté non seulement par les 
conséquences directes de l’occupation israélienne mais également par les conditions socio-
économiques extrêmement difficiles des territoires. Actuellement, il n’existe aucune initiative 
publique ou privée visant à en limiter l’ampleur et les conséquences négatives. Or, étant donné le 
statut spécial des territoires palestiniens, la migration qualifiée pourrait également avoir des effets 
positifs sur leur développement. Convenablement gérée, elle pourrait notamment, au moins 
temporairement, contribuer à la reprise de l’économie domestique. Des chiffres récemment 
communiqués par des établissements de l’enseignement supérieur et l’Autorité nationale palestinienne 
(ANP) font état du retour d’un nombre significatif de palestiniens qualifiés depuis l’étranger. Par 
conséquent, il est indispensable d’accompagner cette tendance positive par le biais d’initiatives 
incitant au retour et limitant le départ des travailleurs qualifiés. La gestion de ce phénomène doit 
figurer au plus vite parmi les priorités des institutions palestiniennes, publiques comme privées. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper addresses the socio-political dimensions of highly-skilled migration from and to the oPt. 
Within Palestinian society, there is a strong impression that massive highly-skilled migration is 
underway. Palestinians widely believe that this trend is increasing given current circumstances, 
including occupation, siege and declining living standards. In parallel, there is also a belief that the 
internal political crisis resulting from the fragmentation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as 
the conflict between Fatah and Hamas has also encouraged highly-skilled migration.  
Examining and scrutinising the phenomenon, this paper reviews available studies and information 
on Palestinian migration and relevant socio-economic traits, including those of highly-skilled 
Palestinian migration. 
“For the purpose of this research, Highly-Skilled Migration is defined as migration of persons with 
tertiary level education, whether they achieved that level before or after migration” (CARIM, 2009). 
The scope of this paper is restricted by various factors. Most importantly, the literature and data 
on external and highly-skilled migration is particularly limited. Despite important studies on this 
phenomenon, as well as its far-reaching implications for other societal sectors, scholars have not yet 
addressed external highly-skilled migration. A mechanism that helps produce a precise estimation of 
external migration rates is lacking and available data does not enable respective bodies to examine 
and analyse this phenomenon. Also, these data do not assist interested researchers in drawing a map 
of demographic mobility from and into the oPt or, for that matter, in building models for mobility 
trends in the future.  
This paper relies in great part on data provided by the 1997 Population Census, and also on the 
2007 Population Census.1 The paper also relies on certain family surveys conducted by the PCBS. It 
makes reference to surveys carried out by other institutions on family samples or qualitative surveys of 
case studies. In addition, the paper refers to previous studies and research papers, which provide 
estimations for migration and analysis of migration factors, incentives, characteristics of migrants, etc. 
In order to produce an analysis that serves the objectives of this paper, some data provided by studies 
entailing family surveys conducted over past years will be reanalysed.  
It should be emphasised that migration, including highly-skilled migration in Palestinian society 
cannot be separated from the Arab-Zionist conflict: Palestinian mobility becomes both a direct and 
indirect product of systematic policies.  
This paper will be divided into two main sections: (i) Addressing highly-skilled migration from the 
oPt to other countries, this section attempts to come up with estimations on the volume of highly-
skilled Palestinian migration, countries to which Palestinians migrate and migration incentives. (ii) 
Tackling return migration to the oPt, the second section examines incentives that encourage skilled 
Palestinians to return to Palestine. We then conclude with results and recommendations.  
2. Palestinian Highly-skilled Migration  
Estimations for the Volume of Palestinian Highly-skilled Migration  
As a point of departure, it will be logical to identify the volume of external migration and relevant 
trends over time. Unfortunately data that would help produce this estimate are not in place. Available 
                                                     
1 Detailed information on the 2007 Population Census has not been published. Information on the Gaza Strip is still 
unavailable.  
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information does not provide an acceptable, concise estimation of external migration from the oPt. 
Therefore, it does not produce an estimate of the number of skilled Palestinians migrating. This is due 
to objective factors, including the Israeli occupying authorities’ control of crossing points and 
restrictions on movement to and from the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967. Additionally, the 
Israeli authorities control the population register.2  
In this context, external migration from the oPt leads to complications, which demand that a 
complex approach be developed in order to estimate migration volume. This approach will combine 
the registration of movement on crossing points; family surveys; as well as surveys on samples of 
local communities in order to monitor families that migrated and information on whom is not available 
by relatives (Ladadweh, 2009).  
By the end of 2007, the Palestinian population was estimated at 10.4 million, more than half of 
whom lived outside historic Palestine (PCBS, 2008). According to estimates from previous studies and 
data released by the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for arrivals and departures through land 
crossings, including the Allenby (Al Karamah) Bridge between the West Bank and Jordan and the 
Rafah Crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, 20,000-30,000 Palestinians are migrate each year. 
Over 2002-2007, more than 20,000 Palestinians migrated from the West Bank per annum (See Table 
(1) in the Annex). It should be emphasised, however, that this information does not cover a significant 
portion of Palestinian migrants who hold the Jerusalemite ID cards as they can use Israeli airports and 
crossing points. Therefore, the volume of Palestinian migration from the West Bank may outweigh 
data from crossing points under Israeli control where Palestinians are present.  
According to available data, annual migration rates in the Gaza Strip stood at approximately 5,000 
persons between 2005 and 2007 (See Table 2 under the Annex). Migration rates should be linked to 
the longstanding siege and closure of the Gaza Strip that prevents many Palestinians from migrating.  
According to a family survey conducted by the Institute of Women’s Studies at Birzeit 
University,3 residential compounds covered by the survey show a high rate of migration. Results 
demonstrate that almost half of the families surveyed has one or more migrant relative. However, 
Hilal counters that this is inaccurate and does not reflect the real volume of migration from 
residential Palestinian localities over the past fifty years.4 Hilal cites estimates developed by 
FAFO’s 1995 survey, which offer a higher rate of families with migrants, namely 57% of all 
Palestinian families (Hilal, in Taraki, 2008, p. 245).  
                                                     
2 According to Ad Duridi, Mohammed, Statistics of Internal and External Migration: Facts and Figures, presented to the 
National Conference on the Population and Development, which was held by the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and 
Administrative Development on 19 October 2009 in Ramallah, there are several impediments to accessing migration-
related information. These impediments are the following: (1) The Israeli occupying authorities control crossing points 
and borders between the oPt and neighbouring countries. As a result, information is not available for Palestinians who 
use Israeli crossings and airports (both arrivals and departures) to and from the oPt. Also, the population register is not 
linked with crossing points and the relevant data are not updated. (2) Israel, in an extension of the political-demographic 
conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, has made relentless attempts to preserve control over statistical information on 
the movement of populations. (3) Official and obligatory laws, including incentives, as well as imperative sanctions are 
not in place. These would help identify the movement of Palestinians within the oPt’s administrative borders. This 
information could be used to upgrade the register on a regular basis. (4) Migration trends resulting from multiple travel 
documents are not completely monitored. Palestinians can hold and use either a Palestinian or a Jordanian passport at any 
time. (5) The Rafah Crossing has been officially closed since June 2006.  
3 The family survey was conducted by PCBS for the Birzeit Women Studies Institute. It covers a sample of 2,000 Palestinian 
families selected from 19 residential locales in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1999.  
4 Hilal hypothesises that the survey sample does not represent all villages in the West Bank. Additionally, the sample is 
restricted to existent families. It does not cover families, all members of whom have migrated to other countries. 
According to the survey, migrants are defined as “family members who reside outside the Palestinian territory and 
relative the householder with any of the following kinship ties: father, mother, son, daughter, wife or husband”. (Hilal in 
Taraki, 2008, p. 243).  
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The Institute of Women Studies’ survey has 30% of Palestinian migrants with an intermediate 
diploma degree or higher, indicating an increasing rate of highly-skilled migration among Palestinians 
(Hilal, in Taraki, 2008, p. 245). Results also indicate that householders’ education plays an important 
role in shaping migration levels. Families, whose heads enjoy a higher level of education or are 
uneducated, typically include migrants. Accordingly, heads of 21% of families with migrant members 
hold a degree above secondary school education. This is the second highest percentage of families 
after families whose heads are illiterate (26%) (see Table (3) in the Annex). In relation to illiterate 
heads of households, these results might be linked to the earlier migration or displacement wave 
inflicted by the Israeli occupation. With regard to householders with a tertiary academic degree results 
are related to the new migration of skilled Palestinian persons, who are looking for employment 
opportunities or better living conditions.  
According to a survey conducted in three Palestinian cities,5 families surveyed had 138 migrant 
members. Over 61% of these had departed from Palestinian territory following the outbreak of the 
second Intifada in 2000. Pursuant to the survey results, approximately 55.8% left the country after they 
obtained their high-school certificate and 14% had a BA degree. 27% decided to migrate before they 
completed their education. Regarding their current educational background, 3.6% of migrants held Ph.D. 
degrees, 9.4% MA degrees, and 26.8% BA degrees. Of the total migrants, results almost 8% were 
engineers, over 8% specialists in trade and economy, and 6% medical specialists (Mattaria, et al, 2008, 
pp. 77-78). This means that about 24% of migrants covered by the family sample were skilled.  
The estimations above may indicate that highly-skilled Palestinian migration is approximately a 
quarter of annual migration. Hypothesising that the volume of annual migration is between 20,000-
30,000 persons, 5,000-6,000 skilled Palestinians depart the country every year. This is not an 
insignificant figure for a small society of 4 million inhabitants on the West Bank, including Jerusalem, 
and the Gaza Strip. External migration may benefit Palestinian society as it provides employment 
opportunities that are not available on the local market. However, results show that some skilled 
Palestinians migrate despite appropriate jobs being in place. Palestinian universities and institutions 
lack required skills. For example, several universities advertise more than once for the same vacancies 
in several specialisations, which means they do not receive applications. This is also the case for other 
institutions specialising in the fields of economy, public finance, monitoring and evaluation.  
Destinations of Highly-skilled Palestinians Migration  
Countries of destination seem to change. Table (4) in the Annex indicates changing trends according 
to migration phase. Although migration to Jordan has sharply dropped, 60% of the total number of 
Palestinian migrants departed for Jordan from 1948-1966. In 1967, a higher rate (77%) of Palestinians 
migrated to Jordan due to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In 1994-1999, 
however, Palestinian migration to Jordan declined to 28%. It should be noted that most Palestinian 
migrants to Jordan comprised the displaced Palestinian population. Characterised as compulsory 
migration, departure for Jordan is not linked to educational background or highly-skilled migration as 
whole villages were displaced.  
Following this phase, migration waves have been more associated with a pursuit of education, 
employment, better living standards, and an escape from harsh conditions and difficult living 
conditions imposed by the Israeli occupying authorities in the oPt. With Jordan’s share decreasing, 
that of Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), North America, European countries 
and Australia rose. It can be hypothesised that highly-skilled migration comprised a major portion of 
Palestinian migration. Migration to North America jumped from only 7% in 1948-1966 to 31% in 
                                                     
5 850 families (with 2,730 members) were selected in major residential localities in the governorate of Ramallah and El 
Bireh, including the cities of Ramallah and El Bireh as well as the town of Beituniya. Persons holding university degrees 
(BA or above) comprised 21.5% of surveyed individuals (Mattaria, et al, 2008, p. 75).  
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1988-1993, but declined to 27% over 1994-1999. Migration to other (Western) countries increased 
from 14% in 1948-1966 to 24% in 1994-1999.  
Drop in migration to the GCC states and to other oil-producing Arab countries following the 
outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 and the Gulf Crisis is associated with the decline of oil revenues 
as well as policies developed by the GCC states in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. GCC 
states devised measures that restricted Palestinian residence. In contrast, the rise of Palestinian 
migration rates to certain Western countries, including Canada, Australia and the US, is probably a 
result of relatively flexible migration policies, which grant higher points to holders of academic 
degrees and to skilled migrants. This means that a larger portion of Palestinian migrants to these 
countries are skilled.  
In a study on the Palestinian brain drain in the health and education sectors almost 34% prefer to 
migrate to Europe; 21% to GCC states; 15% to the US; 14% to Canada; and 15% to other countries. 
The economic situation and relatives were the main reasons for selecting the country of destination 
(49% and 48% respectively). Other reasons include the country’s language and culture (34% and 27% 
respectively). Moreover, easy access to a visa played a significant part in 19% of the cases of 
migration. It is also estimated that three quarters (78%) of migrants have friends in the countries where 
they plan to migrate. Friends usually help make a decision on migration as well as completing relevant 
procedures (Mattaria, et al, 2008, p. 68).  
In general, indicators show rising migration among Palestinians, particularly skilled ones, to 
Western states. Meanwhile, migration to Jordan has declined. Although available data demonstrate a 
drop in migration to GCC states around 1999, highly-skilled migration to these countries might 
resume in light of the plethora of employment opportunities to be found there.  
Factors Associated with External Palestinian Migration  
Table (1) in the Annex shows that the period between 2002 and 2003 saw a large migration wave 
from the West Bank. Especially in 2002, the Israeli occupying forces made large-scale incursions 
into Palestinian cities, despite the fact they had evacuated them as required by the Oslo Accords and 
subsequent agreements. Table (1) also demonstrates a decline in the volume of annual external 
migration around 2006. In view of the conflict following Hamas’ taking of control of the Gaza Strip 
in 2007, migration rates increased once again. Here Table (2) in the Annex indicates a sharp rise in 
the annual migration rate in 2007. As for Gaza, information on the years preceding 2005 are not, 
however, available.  
The above information shows that security and political problems, a result of the Israeli occupation, 
are an essential factor that drives Palestinians to migrate. At the same time, however, Palestinian 
internal political crises has driven more Palestinians to migrate: it is clear that the Palestinian 
authorities should find a settlement for the current political crisis.  
Regarding the Palestinian brain drain in the health and education sectors, a recent survey 
highlighted a sample of health and education practitioners.6 Approximately 31% replied that they 
considered migrating. Almost 80% of these noted that they wanted to migrate in light of the 
deteriorating political and security situation at home. 77% of those articulated their desire to 
pursue recent developments in their specialisations and 61% said they wanted to improve their 
financial situation. Another 48% of persons who considered migrating attribute the reason for 
migration to social factors and 44% to Israeli policies and measures. 19.5% (8 individuals) gave 
other reasons, including a search for freedom, mental relief and a better future for their children 
(Mattaria, et al, 2008, p. 67).  
                                                     
6 The survey covered a number of workers in the health and education sectors. 185 individuals filled out questionnaires. It should 
be noted that 240 questionnaires were distributed. In other words, responses were received from 77% of those surveyed.  
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A recent survey on brain drain in Palestine has a number of case studies of migrant Palestinians, i.e. 
those living abroad on a permanent basis. These included specialists in the health and education 
sectors.7 I have analysed these eight case studies in order to identify incentives behind migration 
decisions. According to these case studies, political-security, economic and social factors drive 
Palestinians to leave Palestine for other countries. These factors can be summarised as follows: 
feelings of insecurity given the deteriorated security situation; difficult access to workplaces in light of 
Israeli checkpoints, closure and curfews; harassment by the occupying Israeli authorities; low salaries 
and the hope of getting a better income; dissatisfaction with one’s job; and the search for a better 
lifestyle. A number of surveyed persons have also migrated to pursue their higher education. 
Originally leaving for a temporary period, migration in the last category has become permanent. Those 
who returned to Palestine and worked for a while decided to migrate on a constant basis.  
The reason for selecting a given country of destination includes considerations of that country’s 
economic state as well as available employment and the chance of a good salary. The presence of 
some relatives was also an essential factor that encouraged persons to migrate to a given a country. 
Additionally, surveyed individuals stated that easy access to a visa and the right to reside in a selected 
country was another reason for migrating there.  
3. Return Highly-Skilled Migration to the oPt  
Estimations of Return Highly-Skilled Migration  
According to results of the PCBS 1997 General Census of Population and Housing, a total of 267,000 
Palestinians returned to the Palestinian territory from other countries. These comprised 10.5% of the 
total population of the Palestinian territory in 1997 (Al Maliki and Shalabi, 2000, p. 53). According to 
a PCBS survey in 2006, this rate dropped to 7.7% (Duridi, 2009).  
The PCBS 1997 Census data show that the educational background of returnees was generally 
higher than that of Palestinian residents. Of the returnees above 10 years of age, 14% had completed 
the first phase of university education and 9.2% the intermediate diploma phase. In comparison to the 
total population, only 4.5% had completed the first phase of university education (Al Maliki and 
Shalabi, 2000, p. 58).  
In the PCBS 2006 survey, percentage of returnees with higher-educational backgrounds was higher 
than in the general population of the Palestinian territory. Compared to 6.6% of the general population, 
returnees holding a BA degree or higher were at 12.6% (Duridi, 2009). This is due to two factors: (1) 
A number of students who had travelled to pursue their education returned; and (2) employees of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation, a large number of whom held academic degrees, also returned to 
Palestinian territory.  
By calculating the number of returnees (175,000 to 280,000 in 2006) as well as those holding BA 
degrees or higher (12.6%), approximately 35,000 returnees are skilled. However, this figure is still low 
when compared to estimations for external highly-skilled migration from the oPt.  
In general, Palestinian returnees are better educated than oPt residents in terms of the numbers who 
have completed higher education. Especially over the first years of the PNA establishment, some 
skilled Palestinian persons returned to their homeland. The data above show a gap in education 
between Palestinian residents and returnees in two respects: (1) a higher-educational level within the 
                                                     
7 Though it does not provide analysis, the study features a summary of each of the eight case studies. For the purposes of this 
paper, I have reviewed and analysed these case studies. To view the said case studies, see Mattaria, Awad, et al, (2008), 
Brain Drain in the Palestinian Society: A Pilot Study of the Health and Education Sectors, Ramallah, Palestinian 
Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), pp. 68-75.  
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ten years that separate the sources of data; and (2) a decline in the number of returning Palestinian 
skilled persons as well as a general drop in the return rates.  
PCBS data indicates that fewer than 11% of returnees to the Palestinian territory came back over 
the past five years, i.e. 2% per annum. On the other hand, 31% of returnees did not reside in Palestine 
after they had returned from abroad 6 or 10 years earlier (6% a year). Those who returned 11 or 15 
years ago comprise 24% (5% a year). Palestinians who returned 16 or more years ago made up 34% 
(Duridi, 2009).  
Incentives for Return  
Data released by the PCBS 1997 General Census for Population and Housing indicate that 
Palestinians’ return was originally associated with political conditions in the region. Two major factors 
propelled migration waves. First, the establishment of the PNA brought back thousands of 
Palestinians, particularly PLO functionaries. Second, many Palestinians were expelled from some 
GCC states following the first Gulf war, causing a compulsory return to Palestine.  
Certain studies indicate that most Palestinians who returned from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states were skilled. In 1993, Nour Masalhah developed a survey with a sample of 795 returnees. Most 
of these had spent 13 years or more in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and in other GCC states before they 
came back to Palestinian territory. According to the survey, the educational level of returnees was 
high. Approximately 67% of returnees to the Gaza Strip and 32% of those returning to the West Bank 
were physicians, engineers, teachers and nurses (Zureiq, 1997, pp. 82-83).  
The PCBS 1997 General Census of the Population and Housing show that 55% of returnees 
accompanied their families back to the Palestinian territory, while accompanying the family relates to 
persons who didn’t take the decision of return, it will not be dealt with. The paper will concentrate on 
other factors, which influence the decision to return. Political factors generated a return migration to 
the Palestinian territory of approximately 45% following the PNA constitution and another 10% in the 
light of displacement from other countries, particularly GCC countries. In addition, 25% returned for 
employment-related reasons: this is the most salient economic factor that has driven return migration. 
With respect to social factors, 16% returned due to marriages and 4% returned after they had 
completed their education.8  
4. Conclusion  
Despite the fact that external migration, in general, and Palestinian highly-skilled migration, in 
particular, are not new phenomena and also bearing in mind the special status of Palestinians and 
earlier displacement, studies of highly-skilled migration as well as studies of its consequences are 
practically non-existent. To this end, the present paper attempted to explain the phenomenon in 
relation to published data and studies. External highly-skilled migration greatly outweighs return 
highly-skilled migration to Palestine. Approximately 5,000-6,000 Palestinians are estimated to migrate 
per annum, while a total of 35,000 skilled Palestinians, holding BA degrees or higher, have returned to 
Palestine over the past years. Several factors prevalent in the oPt have played a role in draining skilled 
Palestinians. These include:  
 Difficult political conditions, including the longstanding Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
territory as well as closure, siege, movement restrictions, etc. Factors include internal political 
crisis and fragmentation.  
                                                     
8 These figures are taken from Al Maliki and Shalabi, 2000, p. 110.  
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 Difficult socio-economic conditions including high unemployment and poverty, difficult 
economic conditions resulting from the Israeli closure and policies, a weak labour market, and 
the search on the part of certain skilled Palestinians for better living conditions.  
Nevertheless, effective official initiatives have not been in place in order to identify the volume of 
highly-skilled migration and overcome any negative effects. Moreover, clear policies have not been 
developed to control this phenomenon. It is worth mentioning here that the borders of Palestine are 
still under Israeli control, which gives a very small margin to the PNA to develop migration policies. 
In addition to that, the hard economic and social conditions of Palestinians in the oPt and the financial 
crises the PNA itself suffers from, are also part of the main factors that limit the PNA in developing 
policies towards migration. 
In regard of the special status of the oPt, migration may generate temporary positive impacts. It 
may provide a short-term alternative for internal economic recovery. If regulated and guided on sound 
grounds, migration will also help develop a strategy for future development. Practical experience has 
proven that a large number of skilled migrants are willing to return to Palestine and are waiting for the 
appropriate chance to do so. Therefore, creating a suitable environment for attracting skilled migrants 
and for a reduction in intensive migration of those whom the homeland needs remains a priority for 
national decision-makers. 
Of particular significance, return highly-skilled migration contributed to establishing the PNA 
and preparing for the Palestinian state. In addition, return migration has provided employment 
opportunities for resident skilled labour forces, thereby preventing their migration in search for 
better chances.  
It should be noted that Palestinian migrants are attached to their family in Palestine. Many studies 
show that migrants transfer money to their families there. According to the analysis of the 
abovementioned eight case studies (Mattariya, et al, 2008), all surveyed individuals transfer financial 
contributions to their family members in Palestine, considering it a familial and national duty. The 
majority of Palestinian migrants think positively about returning to their home when circumstances 
improve and security is established. Their willingness to return is associated with relentless nostalgia 
and homesickness.  
Temporary highly-skilled migration is focused on the pursuit of education. The Palestinian territory 
lacks Ph.D. programmes. Until recently, MA programmes were also lacking. Therefore, migration for 
academic purposes will help promote and develop Palestinian society. Until the mid 1970s, successive 
occupying regimes had left the oPt without higher-education institutions. Returning skilled migrants 
formed the foundations for Palestinian higher education facilities.  
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Annex 
Table 1: Data on Arrivals and Departures Through Al-Karameh Border Crossing (Between the 
West Bank and Jordan) for the Years 2002-2007 
Net 
Number 
Year 
Departures Arrivals 
35,524- 169,690 134,166 2002 
58,674- 200,272 141,598 2003 
9,580- 317,673 308,094 2004 
6,245- 404,681 398,436 2005 
4,592- 412,425 407,833 2006 
14,972- 481,007 466,035 2007 
Source: Mohammad Duridi (2009). Statistics of Internal and External Migration: Facts and Figures. Palestine Central 
Bureau Of Statistics (PCBS). Ramallah. Power Point presentation given at “National Conference on Population and 
Development: Population Issues and Development Implications”. Held on 9th October, 2009. Ramallah: Ministry of Planning 
and Administrative Development 
This data was based on information from the General Directorate of Borders and crossings - Ministry of Interior. 
Table 2: Data on Arrivals and Departures Through the Rafah Border Crossing (Between the 
Gaza Strip and Egypt) for the Years 2005-2007 
Net 
Number Year 
Departures Departures Arrivals 
4,577- 23,065 18,488 2005 
3,953- 156,436 152,483 2006 
5,299- 47,739 41,739 2007 
Source: Mohammad Duridi (2009). Statistics of Internal and External Migration: Facts and Figures. Palestine Central 
Bureau Of Statistics (PCBS). Ramallah. Power Point presentation given at “National Conference on Population and 
Development: Population Issues and Development Implications”. Held on 9th October, 2009. Ramallah: Ministry of Planning 
and Administrative Development 
This data was based on information from Rafah Borders - Ministry of Interior. 
Table 3: Households with or without Migrant Members 
Level of Education by Head of Household (1999) 
Total Number of 
Surveyed Households 
Households (%) 
Head of Household 
Level of Education Households with no 
Migrants 
Households with 
Migrants 
585 26 26 Illiterate 
480 23 20 Elementary 
436 21 18 Proprietary 
347 16 15 Secondary 
405 15 21 Above Secondary 
2253 101* 100 Total 
Source: Hilal in Taraki (2008), p 247. 
* Due to Rounding Numbers. 
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Table 4: Palestinian Migrants by Country of Destination and the Period of Migration (%) 
1994-1999 1988-1993 1968-1987 1967 1948-1966 Country of Destination 
28 23 45 77 60 Jordan 
21 23 28 13 19 Arab Gulf and Other Arab Countries 
27 31 17 1 7 North America 
24 23 10 9 14 Other Countries 
100 100 100 100 100 Total 
Source: Hilal in Taraki (2008), p 247. 
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